Introduction
Secondly, how have these problems been compounded by confusion over terminology and disagreement over norm interpretation?
Introducing the Problem of Definition
In general terms, conflict prevention in the international arena refers to any attempt by third parties to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict. Conflict prevention is a multifaceted, complex process ranging from long-term or structural policy to promote stability, to short-term intensive diplomacy to resolve disputes ("preventive diplomacy") and civilian or military intervention to monitor and/or control the early stages of conflict ("crisis management"). It also refers to attempts to stop the recurrence of violence in conflict zones ("peace-building" or "post-conflict reconstruction/rehabilitiation"). It is therefore an activity primarily, although not exclusively, concerned with the period before the outbreak of war.
Conflict prevention covers a range of activities also associated with gathering information on impending conflict ("early warning"), aid to relieve the effects of conflict, sanctions, and humanitarian intervention. Preventing the recurrence of violence also includes issues of peace-building and post-conflict rehabilitation. It is because conflict prevention covers various stages of the cycle of conflict, (as well as the arbitrary use of multiple similar and interchangeable terms), that confusion concerning policy application arises. The variety of terms used and their implications will be further examined later. Needless to say, this wide interpretation of conflict prevention has hampered attempts to formulate coherent policy specific to a certain conflict at a certain time. Turning a concept which has gained wide support into specific policy, the efficacy of which is frequently contested, has proved remarkably difficult. However, this problem is not a new one, but one that peace researchers have been grappling with for decades.
A Brief History: From Crisis Management to Conflict Prevention?
While conflict prevention seems to have been fast-tracked onto the contemporary political agenda, the idea has a long history. Indeed theories for establishing the conditions necessary for international peace could take us back to the philosophies of prevention ideas are taken back to the emergence of the study of conflict as a separate phenomenon in the new peace research/conflict resolution disciplines of the postWorld War Two period. Conflict prevention emerged as a viable international alternative to superpower crisis management within the American and European peace research communities, and gained more popular acceptance in the climate of détente and with the eventual demise of superpower rivalry.
Inevitably, theories of conflict prevention are closely linked to theories about the causes of war. In the post-Second World war context and with the evolution of nuclear technology, this preoccupation concerned a wide range of academics and practitioners. Nevertheless, the most pressing and high profile potential cause of world war was the escalation of a superpower crisis. Foreign policy analysts, and more generally, those of the strategic studies school were immediately concerned with the control of superpower crises, and the prevention of nuclear war. Traditional concepts of strategy shifted from the pursuit of national objectives through war, to the careful extension of influence and power without resorting to war 3 .
Many strategic studies analysts subscribed to the realist interpretation of international relations. They placed a significant emphasis on the primacy of state interests and competition for power within an anarchic international system of nation states. It was therefore crisis management, (particularly after the apparent successful defusing of the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis), rather than the more abstract notion of conflict prevention, that gained the attention of analysts of foreign policy and international politics. As one of a number of strategic concepts, a cynical interpretation of the technique (as "management" implies) was concerned with how to extract maximum gain from a crisis situation, using tactics such as brinksmanship and coercive bargaining. 4 of stress and threat perception on the crisis decision-making process. 5 The problems associated with "rules" of behaviour in crisis situations were apparent, and every crisis situation was in any case unique.
The idea of crisis prevention gained ground in the climate of détente, which led to more prospects of cooperation between the superpowers. 6 However, the concern remained the immediate short-term prevention of crises rather than a long-term strategy for addressing root causes of conflict. In some cases, this included advocating nuclear weapons as a tool in conflict prevention.
A wider approach addressing these root causes of conflict grew up within the fields of conflict resolution and peace research. and on an ideological level ("cultural" violence). These ideas were developed by practitioners and academics, and gained credence with the rise of the anti-nuclear peace movement in the 1970s and 1980s. 10 Nevertheless, the assertion that a change in both the international system and the domestic structure of states 11 was needed to tackle the root causes of inter and intra-state conflict was not widely welcomed or accepted.
This did not halt the renaissance of the idea of conflict prevention in the post-Cold
War era, however. The demise of superpower crises and the reduced threat of nuclear war led to a new drive to manage peripheral conflict and perhaps even to collectively prevent the outbreak of violent war. Conflict prevention soon gained a prominent place on the contemporary agenda.
Explaining the Rise of Conflict Prevention
Conflict prevention rose to a position of importance on the 1990s political agenda due pervades UN documents and other initiatives arguing for a greater effort to intervene earlier in potential conflict zones. 12 The argument for conflict prevention was again reinforced at the end of the 1990s, with NATO's late intervention in Kosovo, 1999.
The international community had ample opportunity throughout the 1990s to attempt to find a diplomatic solution for the political status of Kosovo, but recoiled from the complex issues of sovereignty and self-determination that the impending crisis raised.
This legacy of failed intervention, along with the recognition that the conflicts of the 1990s needed new international mechanisms if they were to be prevented and better managed, contributed to the rise of conflict prevention. Changes in the perception of state interests and international norms led to a promotion of conflict prevention alongside humanitarianism, leading to attempts to "mainstream" conflict prevention considerations onto the agenda of all actors in the international community.
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The rise in conflict prevention from relative obscurity during the Cold War to development policy-making. These problems have led to a complex contemporary debate on the rationale and effects of conflict prevention policy.
Conflict Prevention: Practical and Conceptual Difficulties
The contemporary debate on conflict prevention covers an array of practical difficulties related to conflict prediction, motivating outside actors, and proving policy success. It also covers normative problems concerning assumptions on root causes of war and the ethics of intervention. Criticism of the conflict prevention ethos, and discrepancies between the intention of conflict prevention policy and likely outcomes of policy paths followed. Although a consensus on the desirability of conflict prevention can be identified, there is still no consensus on terms and meanings.
Problems with Prevention
Fundamental problems with the concept of prevention act as impediments for effective policy application. The nature of a preventive approach and the structure of the international system are not always compatible. Additional difficulties concern problems of prediction and early action, different interpretations of conflict dynamics and patterns, and what constitutes long-term structural prevention.
Predicting Conflict
Predicting conflict at the early stages is notoriously difficult, particularly in the case of internal war. 14 Establishing the likelihood of escalation to violence is complex and can lead to false alarms. Outside actors may not want to obstruct constructive change, or fear that intervention could increase rather than decrease tensions. 15 The lack of media and other interest in successfully defused conflict 16 
Motivating Action
Unfortunately, even the most sophisticated early warning systems will not compensate for a lack of will or motivation to act. Another major problem with conflict prevention concerns the mobilisation of outside actors when there is no pressing need to intervene or immediate threat to international security. 21 The persistence of realist mindsets in governments and international organisations leads to a reluctance to reconsider international norms on non-interference and sovereignty, and a lack of interest in far-flung conflict in regions of little strategic interest.
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Conflict prevention is berated as costly, risky, and potentially counter-productive.
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Supporters, on the other hand, argue for the "realism" of conflict prevention, asserting that the costs of prevention are overestimated, and the assessment of what constitutes "interests" is too narrow. 24 This assertion is supported by the high costs to the international community of reconstruction in South Eastern Europe, and the ramifications of, for example, the US' support of distant terrorist movements that later become a threat to American security. Too often national priorities are based on shortterm domestic political gains rather than long-term commitments to international peace. This observation is neither novel, (cf. Burton 25 , who argued for domestic solutions to international conflict) nor easily changed, however.
The cost of prevention is disputed nonetheless, since at the early stages of conflict prevention the kind of financial commitment necessary is often hard to estimate. A lack of international agreement on how to act often leads to a "wait and see" approach. However, logically the cost of military intervention in most cases far outweighs the cost of early prevention. 26 The real problem goes back to mobilisation.
Decision-making processes in governments are not conducive to conflict prevention, as argued above. While lack of action is often attributed to political will, some analysts place budget over will in explaining the lack of priority given to conflict prevention policy. 27 Definitional problems do not make conflict prevention an attractive option for policy-makers, nor does the wide nature of the concept translate 
Proving Policy Success
Another fundamental problem with prevention, which is closely linked both to the failure to mobilise third parties to act, and to the difficulty in predicting conflict escalation, is proving that conflict prevention policy has been a success. It is difficult to prove that preventive action, rather than other factors, stopped the outbreak of a violent conflict. 32 If success can't be proven, and therefore precedents established, how can we gauge whether a conflict is likely to become violent, or persuade governments and organisations to practice conflict prevention? A preventive approach also assumes that the parties want to resolve the dispute
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; if not, then perhaps no amount of preventive policy will halt impending violence. These problems do not undermine conflict preventive efforts, but make policy choices and the prediction of policy outcomes a complex undertaking.
Competing Assumptions
Conflict prevention policy has to be based on assumptions about the causes of war and the conditions for peace. A false interpretation of the cause of conflict can lead to ineffective conflict prevention policy. While there seems to be a vague consensus that poverty, lack of resources, and problems of governance and political legitimacy lead 31 Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution. 32 Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution. 33 Ibid.
to instability, there is much debate about how much these difficulties contribute to the outbreak of conflict and how they should be tackled. So while a general consensus on the desirability of preventing violent conflict exists, there is a lack of consensus on the specific factors which cause conflict. 34 Furthermore, indicators for structural conflict prevention that are too general may only have limited effect. Clearly, regional, and even country-specific strategies are required to pick up complex root causes of conflict in different contexts. This obviously makes the creation and application of generic preventive policies very difficult.
Long-term conflict preventive approaches are closely linked to development policy. The extent to which this type of policy tackles root causes of conflict is again highly debatable. Conditionality in terms of democratic practice and human rights in trade and aid policy can do much to encourage stability in third world countries.
However, this can be paradoxical in effect. Countries in the most need of help, for instance, Sudan
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, fail to receive European Union and other financial aid because their governments don't meet the stringent conditions on democracy and human rights.
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There are other problems with the ethos behind international financial aid to developing and third world countries. There has been a widespread move away from the strategy of providing special economic help to third world countries, to the promotion of neo-liberal ideals; that is, the free market, and economic development divorced from state control. 37 This strategy is based on the assumption that such policies promote economic stability, which will in turn lead to political stability and peace. However, this assumption remains highly questionable. Nevertheless, it is a strategy evident in the EU's approach in the new Cotonou Agreement with ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries, replacing the trade preferential system of the Lomé Convention. The irony here is that moving economic power away from third world governments, (in an alleged attempt to stamp out corruption) to multinational corporations, clashes with the pledge to politicise development aid for longterm conflict prevention. There are no official conflict preventive guidelines or 34 Dwan, "Consensus: A Challenge for Conflict Prevention?" 35 The ICG describes the continuing civil war in Sudan as "one of the world's longest running and most intractable conflicts" (Sudan Project Overview www.crisisweb.org/projects). EU development assistance has been suspended since 1990 because of the civil war, and lack of respect for human rights and democracy. However, humanitarian aid has continued to be provided (European Commission DG Development, europa.eu.int/comm/development). 36 clearly it is not politically expedient for the advancement and clarification of conflict prevention. 44 Terms are often used interchangeably and without qualification.
Unfortunately, this does not provide the concept with a coherent and comprehensible focus.
Perhaps the clearest classification is that between "operational" prevention, (strategies in the face of conflict) and "structural" prevention (strategies to address the In summary:
• Conflict prevention is not a new idea, despite its recent renaissance. There is much research and analysis to draw on for the formulation of policy.
• Conflict prevention has risen to prominence because of the political agendas of states, organisations and NGOs in the 1990s. The aftermath of recent destructive internal wars also led to a re-evaluation of the effects of third-party mediation and intervention.
• Lack of consensus on the nature of war and peace make conflict prevention policy hard to formulate.
• Wider difficulties with conflict prevention include prediction, the motivation of outside actors, proving policy success, and questions of legitimacy.
• Terminology used in the conflict prevention debate contributes to confusion over policy aims.
Conclusion
Conflict prevention has gained much support in the post-Cold War period. The analysis, theory, and language of peace and conflict researchers has been adopted and built upon by academics and policy-makers in an attempt to address the complex problems of violence and conflict in contemporary times. The development from 54 Abram Chayes and Antonia H Chayes (eds.) Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World, (Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution 1996). 55 The pattern and frequency of conflict in the post-Cold War era is not linear; there have been peaks and troughs throughout the 1990s with a recent pattern of reduction in the number of armed conflicts (Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution) . Nevertheless, the trends of intra-state conflict, complexity in terms of number of actors involved, small arm proliferation, and more recently, terrorism, ensure that conflict prevention remains a salient issue on the international agenda.
superpower-dominated crisis management during the Cold War to collective preventive efforts in the 1990s and beyond is, of course, welcome. However, progress in the application of effective conflict prevention policies has been stunted by a number of important problems and complexities.
Clearly, conflict prevention is difficult to define and carry out. Lack of clarification of terminology has resulted in the term being associated with vague and unattainable goals, and being (simultaneously) synonymous with idealism and unsanctioned intervention. The concept covers attempts to promote stability in general, right through to mechanisms for crisis management and conflict resolution, and even postconflict rehabilitation. It therefore requires a broad, global strategy and targeted regional and country specific policies to cover both the long-term and short-term Neither has there been effective coordination for the division of labour between actors holding expertise in different preventive policy areas. As a result, policy is often haphazard, reactive, and uncoordinated, leading to wasted resources and counterproductive actions. True progress in preventive policy application requires the rhetoric surrounding conflict prevention to be exposed, in order that the genuine problems with the concept are properly dealt with and researched.
